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Abstract
Firms sometimes write price lists or catalogs for their exports, so they set prices for a period of
time and do not adjust prices during that interval in response to changes in their environment.
The ﬁrm sets the price either in its own currency or the importer’s currency. This paper draws
a simple link between the choice of currency and the pricing decision of a ﬁrm that changes
prices in response to all shocks. Speciﬁcally, if the latter ﬁrm’s price has a lower variance in
terms of its own currency than the importer’s currency, then the ﬁrm with a price list will set
the price in its own currency (and otherwise it will set price in the foreign currency). This
relationship is established by consideration of the ﬁrm with a price list as a special case of a
ﬁrm that indexes its export price to the exchange rate. (JEL: F4, F1)
1. Introduction
Many exporting ﬁrms have price lists or catalogs for their exported products.
The price is set for an interval of time and does not respond to changes in the
environment (such as changes in demand or production costs) during that period.
Firms typically set a price either in their own currency or the importer’s currency.
Anextensiveliteraturehasinvestigatedtheoptimalcurrencyofpricesettingwhen
prices are sticky in this way.1
A related literature examines the optimal export price. In some of the litera-
ture, the price is assumed to respond to all shocks that might inﬂuence its price.2
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Another strand of the literature assumes that export prices are set for a period
of time and examines the factors that inﬂuence the price (with the currency of
invoicing given, rather than chosen optimally).3 Here we draw a link between
the literature on currency of price setting and the literature in which ﬁrms can
choose their price ﬂexibly with knowledge of all shocks. When prices are sticky,
the literature uses the terms producer currency pricing (PCP) to denote the case
in which prices are set in the producer’s currency and local currency pricing
(LCP) for the case in which prices are set in the importer’s currency. Can a ﬁrm
making the decision of currency for pricing (PCP vs. LCP) draw on the liter-
ature that examines how ﬂexible export prices respond optimally to exchange
rates?
Hypothetically, ﬁrms that set prices in advance might be able to index their
price to the exchange rate. Consider a ﬁrm that is constrained to choose the
parameters p0 and β so that the log of its price is indexed to the exchange rate by
the function p0 + βs, where s is the log of the exchange rate (expressed as the
exporting country’s price of the importer’s currency.) Let ˆ β be the optimal choice
of β.4
If ﬁrms must choose PCP or LCP, they face a constrained version of the
indexing problem, where they must choose either β =− 1 (PCP) or β = 0
(LCP). If we take a quadratic approximation to the ﬁrm’s objective function, it
follows (as demonstrated subsequently) that ﬁrms that are constrained to choose
PCP or LCP will pick PCP when ˆ β<−0.5, and LCP when ˆ β>−0.5.
We also show that (under the quadratic approximation to the ﬁrm’s objective
function) ˆ β canbedeterminedsimplybyalinearprojectionofthelogoftheﬁrm’s
optimalpriceunderﬂexibleprices( ˆ p∗ inforeigncurrencyterms)onthelogofthe
exchange rate, s: ˆ β = cov( ˆ p∗,s)/var(s). The right-hand side of this equation
is an “unconditional pass-through elasticity.” It is the (population) regression
coefﬁcient of the log of the import price on the log of the exchange rate.
Ourmaintheoremthenfollowsfromthesetworesults.Itsaysthatifpricesare
sticky, ﬁrms choose PCP precisely when ˆ β<−0.5, and LCP when ˆ β>−0.5.
That is, ﬁrms that must set prices in advance will choose to price in their own
currency (so that ex post there is 100% pass-through) exactly when their prices
wouldexhibithigh(unconditional)pass-throughiftheyweresetﬂexibly,andthey
choose LCP (zero ex post pass-through) exactly when their prices would display
3. Examples include Feenstra (1989), Feenstra and Kendall (1997), Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2000), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), Bergin and Feenstra (2001), and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005).
4. Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) build a general equilibrium model in which ﬁrms index to exchange
rates, but the degree of indexation is taken as given. Corsetti and Pesenti (2004) and Goldberg and
Tille (2004) build models in which the degree of indexation is chosen optimally. Tille’s note to me
linking an earlier version of this paper to Goldberg and Tille is what led me to the lemma described
here. Tille’s note shows that the relationship in the lemma holds in the model of Goldberg and
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low(unconditional)pass-throughunderﬂexibleprices.5 Itmightbehelpfultosee
that the condition ˆ β<−0.5 is equivalent to var( ˆ p) < var( ˆ p∗), where ˆ p is the
log of the ﬁrm’s optimal price expressed in its own currency ( ˆ p =ˆ p∗ + s).
The theorem clariﬁes the link between the literature on pass-through, and the
literature on currency of pricing. The main theorem establishes a dual approach
thatgivesamoreconvenientwaytolookatconditionsforPCPorLCP.Thismight
simplify the reading of the literature and might also have practical implications
for ﬁrms that are choosing a currency for invoicing.
The main theorem also provides a caution in interpreting empirical work on
the relationship between exchange rates and prices. The theorem suggests that
without further reﬁnement, ﬁnding that prices do not respond much to exchange
rates is difﬁcult to interpret either as support or contradiction for the notion that
nominal prices are “sticky.” This warning cuts both ways. Export prices may
respond very little to exchange rate changes even when ﬁrms are free to adjust
their prices continuously. The same conditions under which ﬁrms choose LCP
tellusthatimportpricesarenotveryresponsivetoexchangerateseveniftheyare
set ﬂexibly. Conversely, empirical conﬁrmation of models that imply low pass-
through under ﬂexible prices could also be interpreted as evidence of LCP. For
example, some recent studies have found support for models of ﬁrms with freely
adjustable prices in which local distribution services are an important part of the
cost of exported goods.6 The studies conclude that the local-currency stability of
the price of these distribution services is a major explanation for local currency
stability of export prices. Our theorem says that under these same conditions, if
export prices cannot be adjusted in response to shocks, they should be set in the
local-currency price. Without a more detailed study of the adjustment of prices to
distinguish the two types of models, the evidence could be consistent with either
ﬂexible or sticky prices.7
2. Models of Export Pricing
Weconsidertheprice-settingdecisionforamonopolisticﬁrmthatsellsinasingle
foreign market. First we take the case in which the ﬁrm can choose the price for
its product with full information about demand, costs, and so forth. We call that
ﬁrm a ﬂexible-price setter.
5. This result is demonstrated using a second-order approximation of the ﬁrm’s objective function
under uncertainty. Friberg (1998) also links the invoicing literature to the price-setting literature.
This paper generalizes Friberg’s result in a way that is clariﬁed below.
6. For example, Goldberg and Verboven (2001), Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003), Burstein,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2002), and Goldberg and Campa (2005).
7. Examples of empirical studies that have explicitly allowed for both slow nominal price adjust-
ment and incomplete long-run pass-through are Marston (1990) and Goldberg and Verboven
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We assume that the ﬁrm maximizes discounted proﬁts but that the discount
factor D is exogenous for the ﬁrm—not a function of the ﬁrm’s price. If the ﬁrm
is simply maximizing real proﬁts (in terms of purchasing power of the ﬁrm’s
owners), then D is the inverse of the consumer price index for the ﬁrm’s owners.
If ﬁrm owners are risk-averse, D could be the marginal utility of an increment to
proﬁtdenominatedinthecurrencyoftheexporter.Thisobjectivefortheﬁrmholds
underavarietyofpossibleassumptionsabouttheobjectivesoftheﬁrmmanagers,
the structure of asset markets, and possibilities for hedging. The assumption that
D is exogenous to the ﬁrm does rule out some possibilities, however. Suppose
a single household owns the ﬁrm and the owner-manager discounts proﬁts by
marginal utility. The outcome for the ﬁrm might directly affect the level of con-
sumption of the owner, and thus the marginal utility. The assumption that D is
exogenous to the ﬁrm would be violated. An exogenous discount factor is more
sensiblewhen,forexample,therearemanyownersoftheﬁrm,andtherearemany
other sources of income for each owner. Thus our assumption of an exogenous
discount factor is violated in the models of Feenstra and Kendall (1997) and the
model of risk-averse ﬁrm owners in Friberg (1998), who assume in essence that
ﬁrmowners’onlyincomeisfromproﬁts(sothattheﬁrmmaximizestheexpected
utility of proﬁts.)
In the ﬂexible price case, the discount factor is simply a constant that multi-
plies proﬁts and does not affect the optimal choice of price (given the assumption
that the choice of price does not affect D.) The ﬁrm then chooses p∗, the log
of the foreign currency price of its export to maximize the twice-differentiable
concave proﬁt function π(p∗,x). x is a vector of variables that affect the ﬁrm’s
proﬁtsbutareexogenoustotheﬁrm.Thisvectormightincludetheexchangerate.
The ﬁrst-order condition is
πp(p∗,x) = 0. (1)
We want to linearize this function around x = ¯ x, where ¯ x is the mean of x, and
p∗ =˜ p∗, where ˜ p∗ is the value of p∗ that satisﬁes πp( ˜ p∗, ¯ x) = 0. We get
πpp( ˜ p∗, ¯ x) · (p∗ −˜ p∗) + πpx( ˜ p∗, ¯ x)  · (x − ¯ x) = 0, (2)
where πpx( ˜ p∗, ¯ x) is a vector whose ith element is ∂2π(p∗,x)/∂p∗∂xi. Alter-
natively, equation (2) is the ﬁrst-order condition for choosing p∗ to maximize a
second-order approximation (around x and ˜ p∗) of the objective function.8
Solving (2), we get:
ˆ p∗ =˜ p∗ −
π 
px( ˜ p∗, ¯ x)
πpp( ˜ p∗, ¯ x)
· (x − ¯ x), (3)
8. Speciﬁcally, the second-order approximation (using πp(p∗,x) = 0) is given by π(p∗,x) ≈
π(˜ p∗, ¯ x) + πx( ˜ p∗, ¯ x) (x − ¯ x) + 0.5

πpp( ˜ p∗, ¯ x)(p∗ −˜ p∗)2 + (x − ¯ x) πxx( ˜ p∗, ¯ x)(x − ¯ x) + 2(p∗ −
˜ p∗)πpx( ˜ p∗, ¯ x) (x − ¯ x)

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where ˆ p∗ istheoptimalvalueofp*forthisﬁrm.Theunconditionalpass-through
elasticity—the coefﬁcient in the projection of ˆ p∗ on s (the log of the exchange
rate expressed as the home currency price of foreign currency)—satisﬁes
bp∗s =
−π 
px( ˜ p∗, ¯ x)
πpp( ˜ p∗, ¯ x)
· bxs, (4)
where the ith element of the vector bxs is equal to the coefﬁcient in the projection
of xi on s.
Now set aside this case in which the ﬁrm can set its price with knowledge
of all the components of x and turn to the case in which the ﬁrm must set its
price without knowledge of any components of x. Suppose, though, that the ﬁrm
can commit to setting p* as an afﬁne function of s: p∗ = p0 + βs. The ﬁrm
is assumed to maximize a second-order approximation of the proﬁt function,
discounting proﬁts by the factor D. The expansion is around ¯ D (the mean of D),
and ¯ x and ˜ p∗ deﬁned previously:
EDπ(p∗,x)≈ ¯ Dπ( ˜ p∗, ¯ x) + π(˜ p∗, ¯ x)E(D − ¯ D)
+ ¯ Dπp( ˜ p∗, ¯ x)E(p∗ −˜ p∗) + ¯ Dπx( ˜ p∗, ¯ x) E(x − ¯ x)
+ 0.5
¯ Dπpp( ˜ p∗, ¯ x)E(p∗−˜ p∗)2+ ¯ DE(x − ¯ x) πxx( ˜ p∗, ¯ x)(x − ¯ x)
+ 2 ¯ DE(p∗ −˜ p∗)πpx( ˜ p∗, ¯ x) (x − ¯ x)

.
πxx( ˜ p∗, ¯ x) is a matrix whose ijth element is ∂2π(p∗,x)/∂xi∂xj. All of the ﬁrst-
order terms in this expansion drop out, because E(D − ¯ D) = 0, E(x − ¯ x) = 0,
and πp( ˜ p∗, ¯ x) = 0. Simplifying, dropping the constant term, and then dropping
¯ D which multiplies all remaining terms, we can write the objective as
πpp( ˜ p∗, ¯ x)E(p∗ −˜ p∗)2 + E(x − ¯ x) πxx( ˜ p∗, ¯ x)(x − ¯ x)
+ 2E(p∗ −˜ p∗)πpx( ˜ p∗, ¯ x) (x − ¯ x). (5)
Noticethatthediscountfactorhascompletelydisappearedfromtheapproximated
objective function. This occurs because of the assumption that D is exogenous
for the ﬁrm.
Replacing p* with p0 + βs, we ﬁnd the ﬁrst-order conditions for choosing
p0 and β, respectively:
πpp( ˜ p∗, ¯ x)E(p0 + ˆ βs −˜ p∗) = 0,
πpp( ˜ p∗, ¯ x)Es(p0 + ˆ βs −˜ p∗) + πpx( ˜ p∗, ¯ x) Es(x − ¯ x) = 0,
where ˆ β is the value of β that maximizes the objective. From the ﬁrst condition,
we have p0 =−ˆ β¯ s +˜ p∗. Substitute into the second condition to obtain
ˆ βπpp( ˜ p∗, ¯ x)Es(s −¯ s)+ πpx( ˜ p∗, ¯ x) Es(x − ¯ x) = 0.“zwu005060392” — 2006/10/20 — page 1254 — #6
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Solving for ˆ β,w eﬁ n d
ˆ β =
−π 
px( ˜ p∗, ¯ x)
πpp( ˜ p∗, ¯ x)
·
cov(s,x)
var(s)
. (6)
Comparison of equations (4) and (6) immediately gives us the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Under the quadratic approximation to the objective functions, the
unconditional pass-through elasticity when prices are set ﬂexibly, bp∗s, equals
the exchange-rate elasticity of the import price index, ˆ β.
Intuitively,aﬁrmthatcancommittosetthelogofthepriceasalinearfunction
of the log of the exchange rate operates exactly like a ﬁrm that can observe the
exchange rate when setting its price. If that ﬁrm can observe only s, and not other
elements of x, then it will form its optimal linear forecast of ˆ p∗ by taking the
projection of ˆ p∗ on s. Thus, the indexing ﬁrm in essence is a ﬂexible-price ﬁrm
that must set ˆ p∗ as a linear function of s and nothing else.
We can now consider the more realistic case of a sticky-price ﬁrm that must
set a price for export either in its own currency or the currency of the importer.
This ﬁrm can be thought of as choosing an index function, p0+βs, but with only
two choices of β,0o r−1. If β = 0, the export price is constant in the foreign
currency, so the ﬁrm is LCP. If β =− 1, the price is constant in the producer’s
currency, so the ﬁrm is PCP.
The main theorem draws a link between the choice facing this ﬁrm and the
ﬁrm that can set prices ﬂexibly with full knowledge of x.
Theorem 1. Under the quadratic approximation to the ﬁrm’s objective func-
tion, when a ﬁrm must set its price in advance and choose between LCP or
PCP, it chooses LCP exactly when the unconditional pass-through elasticity for
the ﬂexible-price ﬁrm is less than one-half in absolute value (bp∗s > −0.5).
Likewise, the ﬁrm that sets price in advance chooses PCP if and only if the
unconditional pass-through elasticity for the ﬂexible-price ﬁrm is greater than
one-half in absolute value (bp∗s < −0.5).
Proof. The objective function of the ﬁrm that sets price in advance is continuous
inβ.Becausethefunctionisquadratic,itissymmetricarounditsuniquemaximum
point, ˆ β, given in equation (6). Because the quadratic function is continuous,
strictly concave and symmetric, the value of the objective function is higher for
β = 0 than for β =− 1 (so LCP is preferred) when ˆ β>−0.5, and PCP is
preferred when ˆ β<−0.5.
But if ˆ β>−0.5, then, from Lemma 1, bp∗s > −0.5.
Because ˆ β>−0.5 is equivalent to var( ˆ p∗)<var( ˆ p), an alternative inter-
pretation of the theorem is that with sticky prices ﬁrms choose LCP under the“zwu005060392” — 2006/10/20 — page 1255 — #7
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same conditions that the ﬂexible-price ﬁrm’s price would have a lower variance
when expressed in the importer’s currency than the exporter’s currency.
3. Discussion
Here we consider an example that encompasses a lot of the literature on pass-
through and the choice of currency for price setting.9
Consider a ﬁrm that faces a demand curve YD = G(P∗/Z)N. P∗ is the
foreign-currencypriceoftheﬁrm’sproduct,Z isapriceindexofproductsthatare
substitutesforourﬁrm’sproduct,andN representsotherfactorsthatshiftdemand.
We assume that the product is produced using two variable inputs: one local and
one foreign. The local input might be labor used to produce the product, and the
foreign input might be foreign labor used to distribute the product, or to assemble
imported intermediate goods into ﬁnal products. The cost function takes the form
C(Y)·H(W1,SW∗
2),whereC  > 0andC   maybepositiveornegative.10 Y refers
to output for the ﬁrm. We assume H(···) is homogeneous of degree 1. W1 is the
home-currency nominal unit factor costs for the home input. W∗
2 is the cost of the
foreign-currencypriceoftheforeigninput.S isthehomecurrencycostofforeign
currency.
Application of equation (3) in this case yields
p∗ =
ε + δγ(γ − 1)
 
z+
δ(γ − 1)
 
n+
ω(γ − 1)
 
(w1−s)+
(1 − ω)(γ − 1)
 
w∗
2,
where lower-case letters are the logs of their upper-case counterparts. Here, we
have γ ≡− P∗G /ZG (the elasticity of demand for the product), ε ≡ P∗γ  /Zγ
(the elasticity of the elasticity of demand), δ ≡ C  Y/C  (a measure of concavity
or convexity of the cost function), ω ≡ H1W1/H (factor 1’s share of costs), and
  ≡ γ − 1 + ε + δγ(γ − 1).11
We have from this equation that bp∗s is given by
bp∗s =
ε + δγ(γ − 1)
 
bzs +
δ(γ − 1)
 
bns
+
ω(γ − 1)
 
bw1s +
(1 − ω)(γ − 1)
 
bw∗
2s −
ω(γ − 1)
 
. (7)
9. This example is worked out in great detail in an earlier draft of this paper, Engel (2003).
10. There is a second-order conditions for a maximum to be satisﬁed (see subsequent discussion).
11.  >0 by the second-order condition for proﬁt maximization.“zwu005060392” — 2006/10/20 — page 1256 — #8
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It follows that PCP is optimal when
[ε + δγ(γ − 1)]bzs + δ(γ − 1)bns + ω(γ − 1)bw1s + (1 − ω)(γ − 1)bw∗
2s
<
(2ω − 1)(γ − 1) − ε − δγ(γ − 1)
2
. (8)
This example can be related to some of the literature on optimal currency of
pricing:
The necessary and sufﬁcient condition derived in Devereux, Engel, and Stor-
gaard (2004) for PCP pricing is a special case of this condition when ε = 0 (so
demand is constant elasticity), δ = 0 (so the cost function is linear in output),
ω = 1 (so only local inputs are used), and γ>1. In that case, the condition
reduces to bw1s < 0.5 (which corresponds to their Proposition 1).
The simple example behind Proposition 1 of the partial equilibrium model of
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005) is also a special case, when the exchange rate
istheonlystochasticvariable,ε = 0,ω = 1,andγ>1.Inthatcase,equation(8)
becomes δγ < 1 (which corresponds to their Theorem 1). The condition for PCP
pricinginBachettaandvanWincoop’smoregeneralmodelcanalsobeinterpreted
as a special case of equation (8). That model allows for the price of competing
goods to covary with the exchange rate—that is, bzs  = 0, but still maintains
ε = 0, ω = 1, and γ>1. Under these assumptions, equation (8) reduces to
δγ(1 + 2bzs)<1.
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003) consider a model in which there are
two stages of production: Exporters sell intermediate goods to ﬁnal producers,
who in turn sell to consumers. If the ﬁnal producers are LCP, then the exporting
ﬁrm’s problem is a special case of the one considered here in which the only
stochastic variable is the exchange rate, ε = 0, ω = 1, and γ>1. (The input for
exporters is the wage in the exporting country, and Z is the price of ﬁnal goods.
Z is nonstochastic when ﬁnal goods producers follow LCP.) The condition for
the exporter to price in its own currency is then the special case of equation (8)
given by δIγI < 1 (as in their Theorem 1), where δI measures the curvature
of the exporting ﬁrm’s production function and γI is the elasticity of demand
faced by exporters. If the exporters are PCP, then the ﬁnal goods producers also
have a problem that is the same special case. The input price is the price of the
exported good, which is priced in the exporter’s currency (so ω = 1), and only
the exchange rate is stochastic. The condition for LCP pricing is a special case
of equation (8): δFγF > 1 (as in their Theorem 2), but now δF relates to the ﬁnal
goods producers’ technology, and γF is the elasticity of demand of ﬁnal goods
consumers.BacchettaandvanWincoopthenconcludethereisaNashequilibrium
in which exporters play PCP and ﬁnal goods producers play LCP if δIγI < 1 and
δFγF > 1.“zwu005060392” — 2006/10/20 — page 1257 — #9
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Giovannini’s (1988) model is the special case in which the exchange rate
is the only random variable (so the entire left-hand side of the inequality in
equation (8) is zero) and ω = 1. In that case, the condition for PCP pricing
reduces to (1 − δγ)(γ − 1) − ε>0, which is precisely the condition that the
proﬁt function is convex in the exchange rate.
Friberg (1998), as this paper, compares pass-through under ﬂexible prices to
conditions for PCP versus LCP when nominal prices are set in advance. He, like
Giovannini (1988), considers the special case in which the exchange rate is the
onlyrandomvariableandω = 1.Inthiscase,intheﬂexiblepricemodel,wehave
−bp∗s = (γ − 1)/(γ − 1 + ε + δγ(γ − 1)).
Because Friberg assumes γ>1 and δ>0, a sufﬁcient condition for
the pass-through coefﬁcient (−bp∗s) to be less than one is ε>0. An even
stronger condition is ε>γ. Turning to the sticky-price models, under Friberg’s
assumptions, the condition for ﬁrms to choose LCP pricing is
(1 − δγ)(γ − 1) − ε<0.
This condition is met when ε>γ. This is Friberg’s theorem: that, when δ>0
(and in the conﬁnes of his set-up in which the exchange rate is the only random
variable and ω = 1), a sufﬁcient condition for both LCP pricing and a pass-
through coefﬁcient less than one is ε>γ.
Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) solve the optimal indexing problem for a ﬁrm
(embedded in a general equilibrium model) with a linear cost function and con-
stant elasticity of demand. The coefﬁcient that indexes the log of the import price
to the log of the exchange rate can be determined from equation (7) in this case,
with ε = 0, δ = 0, ω = 1, and γ>1: ˆ β = bp∗s = bw1s − 1.
Finally, note the role of distribution costs incurred in the importing country.
If prices are set with full information about the exogenous variables affecting
proﬁts, then when distribution costs are a large share of total costs (when 1 −
ω is close to one) there will be a large elasticity of p∗ with respect to w∗
2.I f
wages are very stable (have low variance and therefore a low covariance with
the exchange rate) and ω is close to zero, then the import price will tend to be
stabilized in the importer’s currency. That is the result noted by, for example,
Goldberg and Verboven (2001), Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003), Burstein,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2002), and Goldberg and Campa (2005). That result
says that, if distribution costs are signiﬁcant and those costs are relatively stable
in the importer’s currency, then the apparent pass-through of the exchange rate to
the ﬁnal goods price will be low.
However, under these same conditions, LCP will be optimal. That is, when
distributioncostsarealargeshareoftotalcostsandwhenthewageintheimporting
cost is stable, it is optimal for the exporting ﬁrm to set the price in the consumer’s
currency.“zwu005060392” — 2006/10/20 — page 1258 — #10
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To elaborate on this condition, consider the case in which the production
function is CES, so that
H(W1,SW∗
2) = (λW1−α
1 + (1 − λ)(SW∗
2)1−α)
1
1−α.
Then we have
1 − ω =
(1 − λ)(SW∗
2)1−α
λW1−α
1 + (1 − λ)(SW∗
2)1−α.
In the Cobb–Douglas case (α = 1),w eh a v e1− ω = 1 − λ. In that case, the
unconditionalpass-throughislowerthelargertheshare1−λofforeigninputsinto
theproductionprocess.Thatisalsothecase,asthetheoremstates,inwhichLCPis
morelikely.Whenforeignanddomesticinputsarecombinedinﬁxedproportions
(as in the model of Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2002) in which labor in
the importing country is used to distribute the good), we ﬁnd
1 − ω = ((1 − λ)SW∗
2)/(λW1 + (1 − λ)SW∗
2).
Under ﬂexible prices, pass-through will be low when the cost of distribution
services is high and 1 − λ is large, but again those are also the circumstances in
which the exporter that invoices prefers LCP.
Equation (8) is a general statement of a standard model of pass-through in
the international trade literature, and suggests empirically testable propositions.
Pass-throughshouldbehighwhenequation(8)issatisﬁed,andlowotherwise.But
empirical evidence of this link—that, for example, pass-through is low when the
distribution share is high, or when demand becomes more elastic at higher prices
(ε > 0)—does not distinguish whether the ﬂexible-nominal-price model or the
sticky-nominal-price approach is appropriate for macroeconomic modeling. The
theorem of this paper shows that both types of models imply high pass-through
when the condition of equation (7) is met, and low pass-through when it is not.
The work cited previously ﬁnding a link between high distribution shares and
low pass-through, or the studies cited in Goldberg and Knetter (1997) uncovering
a link between variable elasticity of demand and pass-through,12 do not help
us draw inferences about the applicability of ﬂexible-price versus sticky-price
models of import pricing.
It is worth noting a few precautions in interpreting these results. First, all
of this discussion pertains to the behavior or a single ﬁrm taking the economy
as given. Some of the papers mentioned cast the ﬁrm in a general equilibrium
context, but condition (8) takes the vector of regression coefﬁcients, bxs,a sg i v e n
totheﬁrm.Ingeneralequilibrium,theseareendogenous.Second,theseresultsare
12. For example Aw (1993) and Goldberg and Knetter (1997) ﬁnd such links.“zwu005060392” — 2006/10/20 — page 1259 — #11
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derivedforasecond-orderapproximationtotheproﬁtfunction.Insomeinstances,
third or fourth moments may not be small.
An obvious limit to the model presented here is that it is static. The intuition
of the result of this paper is that ﬁrms prefer to invoice in the importer’s cur-
rency when unconditional pass-through is low under price ﬂexibility. But a fuller
dynamic analysis would be required to determine the degree to which sluggish
price adjustment contributes to local currency stability of import prices.13
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